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Abstract 
The European Union and the discussion on its democratic deficit is the central 
theme to this thesis. Democracy is traditionally discussed based on the nation-
state but here the debate on how democratic legitimacy can be achieved in a 
globalized society, where political issues transcend borders, is utilized. 
Regionalization is a central concept in globalization because it is transnational to 
its nature and sometimes by-passes the nation-state in its influence on EU policy-
making. It is investigated whether the lobbying activities of regional offices can 
be democratically justified and the case of the South Sweden European Office is 
used for empirical observations. Further, the participation of regional offices 
suggests helping the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. This is 
investigated using a Multi-Level Governance approach together with a discussion 
on lobbying as a means of democratic participation. 
 
Keywords: regional lobbying, Multi-Level Governance, democratic deficit, civil 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Purpose 
From the signing of the Nice Treaty to the Convention on the Future of Europe 
the debate on the distance between the European institutions and the citizens of 
Europe has been evident and caused concern. We cannot describe the European 
Union as a representative democracy in the usual terms. A discussion of the 
democratic deficit in the European Union must take a different turn as governance 
and democracy has moved beyond the nation-state. A suggested solution to the 
democratic deficit has involved the participation of civil society and I want to 
investigate this further to see what implications for democracy that brings. 
 
The sensitivity of lobbying as a function in a democratic system is evident. 
There is a discussion about its impact on democracy in Sweden, which has 
evolved from a corporatist system to a more pluralist with informal pressure now 
being accepted in the system. In the European Union, influence from several 
different actors, both public and private, are invited in order to enable the work of 
the institutions, and lobbying seems to be regarded as a positive force to enhance 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
Regional lobbying in the European Union is interesting as lobbying first of all 
is controversial in a democratic aspect, while as the regions have been invited to 
participate in the decision-making. Through the Committee of the Regions, these 
have a formal channel of influencing the policy-shaping, but they also exercise 
informal participation through lobbying by the regional offices. I have chosen to 
analyze the activities of regional offices because they portray unusual 
characteristics on the lobbying arena. Lobbying activities are usually associated 
with business interests and non-profit organizations (NGO) that work for a special 
interest, while regional offices represent a more collectivistic interest, which may 
point to difficulties in forming the same. Because they lobby on behalf of elected 
governments, they also hold an element of accountability. They are however 
representing civil society and the function of civil society participation is a focus 
of this thesis. The regions also add a dimension to European politics that involves 
an alternative aspect of the European Union, the view of the EU as a multi-level 
system instead of an arena for intergovernmental bargaining. This also contributes 
to an opening of the discussion of democratic legitimacy. 
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1.1.1 The Research Question 
Deriving from the discussion above I have identified the following research 
question to guide my analysis. 
 
Can civil society participation in the form of regional lobbying help the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union? 
 
This broad question can be taken apart and forms the following questions: 
 
Can lobbying be seen as democratic? 
What are the lobbying activities of the regional offices? 
Can participation replace representation? 
 
This requires a theoretical discussion on democracy and civil society 
participation with a further analysis of the lobbying activities of regional offices. 
Multi-Level Governance provides an opportunity to discuss the involvement of 
the regions as well as the democratic deficit.  I have used South Sweden as an 
empirical example, drawing observations from this particular case as well as from 
the literature on regional office lobbying in general.  
 
The choice of using research questions is based on the opportunity for a more 
open discussion of results as I am using a qualitative method with a hermeneutic 
research approach. There are many assumptions around what democracy is and 
how it should be conducted. To falsify or verify hypotheses therefore seems bold 
and the research question leaves more room for interpretation. The conclusions 
can be developed around what activities help democracy as well as what activities 
may be questionable from a democratic point of view. 
1.2 Assumptions and Limitations 
The following discussion highlights assumptions and limitations I find important. 
Several aspects of the debate on the democratic deficit and lobbying in the 
European Union are fascinating to investigate but I have limited my discussion to 
regions. They are alternative actors in civil society participation as they represent 
a common interest to a larger extent than other actors on the lobbying arena. I 
have assumed that regions do represent civil society in a broad sense. In this thesis 
‘civil society’ and the ‘public’ are consequently territorially divided in regions 
and are therefore used as a reference to citizens in general as well as citizens of 
the particular region that the office represents. 
 
I have limited my study to investigating lobbying at the sub-systemic level 
where policy-shaping takes place as this is the access point where lobbying is 
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most effective. Once a proposition has been made by the Commission, there is not 
much room to influence the format.  
 
Regions also lobby their national governments, to make sure their interests are 
preserved in the EU. There is no possibility to elaborate on this in depth, but I 
have instead focused on the regions’ efforts to by-pass the nation-state and 
influence EU decision-making on their own. 
1.3 Outline 
This thesis aims to explain how regional lobbying can help the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union and I have used the South Sweden Regional 
Office as a single case study to provide an empiric example for my analysis. 
Chapter 2 discusses the methodology and research approach I have used to 
achieve my results together with a brief introduction of first-hand sources. 
Chapter 3 continues with the construction of a theoretical framework for analysis, 
where I confer to Multi-Level Governance and Networking together with concepts 
from Democracy Theory. I move on to a deeper investigation of regional lobbying 
applied to the European Union, explaining regionalization, Regional Policy as 
well as formal and informal channels to influence policy-making. Further, I 
investigate the case of the South Sweden European Office in-depth and its relation 
with the Swedish government. The thesis concludes with analysis and results. 
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2 Methodology 
The intention of research is to increase our knowledge about reality, leading us 
to an ability to behave in it with a constructive approach. Reality is characterized 
with complexity, contradictions and ambiguity, which will shine through in the 
research process. The method states what is necessary or appropriate for the 
researcher to acknowledge when collecting material, analysing it scientifically, 
and presenting the results. The angle of approaching the problem is of great 
interest and the core of the method; the common sense used by the researcher. 
(Lundquist 1997: 96-97) (Wallén 1996: 11) 
2.1 Research Philosophy and Approach 
This study utilizes a qualitative research method deriving from a hermeneutic 
philosophy of reality; it is assumed that the human intellect does not have the 
capacity for an objective comprehension of the world around us. Objectivity is 
difficult to reach, as we cannot understand anything without being affected by the 
language used and the experiences gained over time. With a hermeneutic 
approach to reality, understanding can be reached by interpretation of experiences, 
and the understanding of people and their dialogue is central. The purpose of this 
investigation is therefore to understand and interpret the social phenomena for 
analysis, and provide an explanation that is dependent on my interpretations of the 
language and relationships between actors. Thus, my interpretation is colored by 
my understandings and provides one angle of this issue that I find the most 
appropriate. (Marsh, Stoker 2002:21-28) (Wallén 1996: 33-34) 
 
I have constructed a theoretical framework based on Multi-Level Governance 
and Networking together with a discussion on transnational democracy derived 
from traditional democracy theory and their concepts, in particular representation 
and participation. To add further, the theoretical discussion on the importance of 
information in a democracy concludes with a discussion of lobbying as such an 
informational activity in a democratic environment. This framework is 
constructed in order to analyze the lobbying activities of regional actors, with the 
case of South Sweden as an illustrating example. The framework is designed to 
provide variables that can later be tested on my observations. Different theories 
may imply different connections between variables that lead to a particular result. 
A linked series of causal hypotheses that indicate how connections among 
variables are made can be appropriate in this case. (King, Keohane, Verba 1975: 
225) 
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2.2 Method and Material 
The qualitative method of using a case study, which includes interviews, use 
naturalistic and uncontrolled observation of a topic, which means that reality is 
subjective. I cannot escape this in my research and recognize the subjectivity of 
my results from both interviews as well as secondary material. 
 
Even though I am using a single case study I can make observations from 
general information of lobbying activities of regional office as they have several 
common characteristics and a common purpose in representing civil society in 
Brussels. My conclusions are therefore drawn upon regional office lobbying in 
general and I have used the case of South Sweden to gain a deeper insight into 
these unusual actors. Therefore I suggest that using a single case in this study will 
not serve any methodological uncertainties. Instead I can use the case study to 
make additional observations that would not have been evident by using 
secondary material. By direct interaction and interviews with people on the edge 
of this activity, valuable information has been collected. (King, Keohane, Verba: 
1994: 208-210) 
2.2.1 The interviews 
I attended a presentation of Sydsam and the South Sweden European Office 
(SSEO) in Brussels held by Frida Bergman, administrative official at the office. It 
took place in a small group and gave me lots of opportunities to ask questions, in 
order for her to elaborate further on a topic. To initiate the research process for the 
case study in this way was positive as it gave me the opportunity to see how they 
present themselves to the public rather than to a researcher on democracy. 
 
 For the interview with Roger Kaliff, the president of the executive committee 
of Sydsam, I used open-ended questions to allow him to talk at length on a topic. 
These methods are common within qualitative research where the researcher are 
looking for interpretations of human actions and relationships rather than 
quantitative data that can be generalized from. Throughout the research process I 
also had the help of Annica Olsson, administrative official at the Sydsam 
secretariat.  
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2.2.2 Secondary sources 
 
Interviews have been conducted with several regional offices, including South 
Sweden, by Magnus Jerneck and Janerik Gidlund using a qualitiative method 
(2001). Having access to this secondary material was very helpful since I did not 
have the opportunity to conduct so many interviews myself. Choosing South 
Sweden for my case study was due to proximity.  I’ve taken into consideration my 
own subjectivity in my understanding of their results but I am able to compare 
them with mine and draw general conclusions. A more quantitative survey on 
lobbying in Brussels was performed by Irina Michalowitz (2004) among regional 
offices, political consultants and lobbyists from private firms. From this survey I 
was able to collect valuable information about types of activities that regional 
offices are involved in. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
Democracy has traditionally been discussed using representation in a nation-
state as a precondition; hence the discussion on the democratic deficit in the 
European Union has taken a turn where the solution would be to increase 
representation. But the European Union is not a state, although the discussion on 
the democratic deficit often leads to conclusions where the EU is looked upon as 
an expansion of the nation-state democracy. The polity portraits problems with 
citizen participation, accountability, political competition, transparency and 
European identity. The debate then often concludes that in order to solve the 
democratic problem, EU has to evolve into a federal state where these democratic 
values can be safeguarded, or reduced to a confederation where member states are 
responsible for the democratic legitimacy of the Union. 
 
The EU must naturally be defined in order to analyze its structure. The 
problem is however, that the European Union, as we have concluded, is not a 
state. Some scholars have chosen to analyze the system looking upon it as an 
international organization. I have chosen to look upon the EU as neither a state 
nor an international organization. In this study I have chosen the view of the EU 
as a multi-level system, especially since I will discuss the influence of sub-
national governments on policy-making in the system and the implications of 
democracy this involvement brings.  
3.1 Analyzing Democracy in the European Union 
A lot of the debate on the democratic deficit of the European Union focuses on 
input-legitimacy and the lack of it. I have used Jachtenfuchs definition of 
democracy as:  
 
“the institutionalization of a set of procedures for the control of governance 
which guarantees the participation of those who are governed” (1998: 47) 
 
The definition by Jachtenfuchs is emphasized because it highlights 
participation and not just representation. 1 Theoretically there are many ways to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 although I want to discuss the concept of democracy further in order to 
present several views. 
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make sure citizens participate in governance and in this definition parliamentary 
democracy where majority versus minority rules does not necessarily induce 
democracy. Over the last decades, efforts have been made to create some kind of 
representative governance structure in the EU to achieve legitimacy. 
(Jachtenfuchs 1998: 47) It is generally agreed among scholars that the European 
Parliament does not have enough power to solve this problem, and there are many 
arguments against an increase of their power. The power of the European 
Parliament is not essential for this analysis; instead the focus will lie on the 
Commission and the sub-systemic level of policy-making where influence by civil 
society is focused. As the theory and practice of democracy has always been 
closely tied to the state, it causes problems for the debate on democratic 
legitimacy in a transnational organization such as the European Union in an era of 
globalization. (Dryzek 1999: 30) (Newman 2004: 357-358) Globalization is a 
relatively new phenomenon and can be suggested to mean that “social, political 
and economical activities have become world-wide in scope and that levels of 
interaction have become more intensified and interconnected. Political issues that 
are important for society transcend to a level where nation-states cannot control 
them and the traditional concepts of democracy are no longer sufficient enough to 
analyze this situation. (Held 1996:21) 
 
As discussed in the introduction, I want to suggest that the participation of 
civil society helps contribute to input legitimacy in the European Union. Regional 
governments are essential for this discussion as they can be defined as civil 
society in a broad sense. They also represent both public and private interests and 
are closest to the citizens. In order to explain their importance as actors in the 
European Union it is necessary to take a standpoint that does not necessarily 
emphasize the EU as an arena for intergovernmental interaction. Multi-Level 
Governance can help explain the importance of actors of different kinds and on 
different levels. 
3.2 Multi-Level Governance and Networking 
European integration together with regionalism has changed the political 
implications for the nation-states as it has formed decision-making levels above as 
well as below the state-level. Multi-Level Governance (MLG) provides an 
alternative perspective on the European Union, differing in its interpretation of the 
system as intergovernmental. It does not deny the importance of states as actors, 
but argues that national governments are not able to control the supranational 
institutions they have created. The specialization of EU policy-making is 
increasing and the European Council, which is the arena for intergovernmental 
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bargaining, relies on the Commission to set the agenda, forge compromises and 
supervise compliance. MLG thus points out that there are several points of access 
in the system that are not restricted to state actors but also to sub-national and 
transnational interest groups. (Hooghe, Marks 2003: 309-311) (Keating, Hooghe 
2004: 240) 
 
An important feature of the MLG theory is its reflections around ‘government’ 
and ‘governance’. Government is too narrowly defined, connected to the nation-
state and the regulation of access to scarce resources and conflict over 
fundamental values. Governance on the other hand, refers to a broader sense of 
politics where the production, accumulation and regulation of collective goods at 
all levels are noted. It sees power relations as “structured by reciprocal 
interdependence on each other’s resources.” MLG takes a normative stand, 
promoting the idea that this approach to understanding the European Union brings 
in a dimension that is closer to the people. Due to its predisposition that the policy 
process in the European Union can be described more accurately through a multi-
level system, it opposes an intergovernmental approach. Because it recognizes 
multiple forms and levels of decision-making it provides a basis for enhancing 
democratic legitimacy and effective policy-making in a globalized society. 
(Marsh, Stoker 2002: 37-38) 
 
The European Union is characterized by negotiations between several 
independent actors and cannot be seen as a hierarchical decision-making body 
based on majority. Decisions taken on the higher levels are dependent on the 
consent of the lower and it has an important consequence; the institution’s self-
interest is often more important than the substantive interests. Because political 
parties and beliefs based on ideology do not have the same importance as it does 
on a national level this competition is missing. The relationship between the 
actors within the EU is characterized by loose coupling; information exchanges 
between the different levels play a key role in the system. (Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-
Koch 2004:103-105) In Multi-Level Governance, different levels such as 
international, national, regional and local, with networks in addition to these, 
possess authority. Hence power can be derived from all of these levels and not 
just the centre. Regions can be defined broadly as a part of civil society and these 
have increased access to funds from the EU. Academics debate the ability of sub-
national actors to develop channels to EU policy-making independent from the 
national governments, meaning that the national governments are able to restrain 
their access. However, this intergovernmental approach can be challenged by 
MLG that recognizes several players on the EU arena. (Bache 1998: 156) (Pedler 
2002:4) 
 
The involvement of external actors in the European policy-making process is 
determined by the value they are able to contribute to efficient problem-solving as 
well as the resources they have to influence. The Commission has invited external 
experts to strengthen its role as a political entrepreneur. In this sense the 
involvement of interest groups and experts at this stage does not only serve the 
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purpose of increasing input legitimacy, there have also been suggestions that the 
policy-making has increased in quality. (Mauer 2003: 168) 
 
The system with a multitude of different expert committees to prepare policy-
making gives EU governance a distinct networking feature. This culture of 
consultation and communication between the committees and external actors is 
essential for two major reasons. Firstly, different interests based on ideological 
positions through party competition do not push decision-making forward because 
the Commission is to remain a non-political technocratic body. Secondly, because 
of the complex nature of our society today, along with the complexity of the 
involvement of 25 national political systems, the system needs extensive 
resources to rely on. Defining the problem and analysing the given situation must 
be a priority for the institution. Gathering information in the form of expertise and 
argument is the most striking pattern of interaction and the Commission is able to 
take the lead when negotiations take a turn to analysing the factual aspects of a 
decision. Advisory committees are geared to support the decision-making process 
by providing this much-needed expert knowledge and the Commission even has a 
legal duty to consider any new development based on scientific facts.2 
(Christiansen 2004: 100-102) 
 
Fragmentation is also an essential feature of the EU political system as there 
are massive cross-sectoral differences in policy-style. There are policy areas that 
are seen as best dealt with at the European level and policy areas that are to be 
solved on a national or regional level, which means that power and authority is to 
be divided and shared for efficiency. Even if the debate in some hesitant member 
states revolves around the loss of sovereignty there is still a consensus among the 
elite that decision-making authority must be spread across the different European 
levels of government. (Falkner 1997: 5) (Hallström 2003: 2) 
 
The main critics of MLG are unsurprisingly intergovernmentalists, who 
discuss the ’joint decision trap’.3 They claim that too many participants, multiple 
arenas and several potential combinations of policy-making processes creates 
deadlock. A greater complexity in the decision-making process creates opacity 
and thus the accountability is lost and this decreases democratic legitimacy. 
(Marsh, Stoker 2002: 38)  
3.3 Democracy Theory 
When looking upon the European Union as a multi-level system with points of 
access for several non-state actors to exercise pressure, it becomes interesting to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 see also EC Treaty, Art 95, 3 
3 see Moravscik 1993 
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develop the discussion on the proposed democratic deficit in the system further. 
The analysis in this paper is derived from the view of the EU as a multi-level 
system with networking features.  In order to provide a framework I also intend to 
discuss democracy theory by using concepts from several different democracy 
theories and create a tool for analysing democracy and lobbying in the EU. 
Recently, the academic discussion on democracy has begun to develop concepts 
surrounding this essential feature of politics. Society is changing and globalization 
brings with it issues concerning democracy that cannot easily be solved. I do not 
attempt to contribute to the ‘redefining’ of democracy but rather discuss elements 
of the existing democracy theory as well as draw upon the quite recent scholarly 
discussion on democracy in a globalized world. This should build an adequate 
framework to base my analysis upon. I intend to establish a connection between 
the activities of sub-national actors such as lobbying with the debate on the 
democratic deficit in a non-state polity such as the European Union. 
 
Democracy is a form of government that is founded on the citizen’s consent 
and is crucial for legitimizing government. The political elite compete for power 
and need to follow the public will. It is first hand carried out through elections 
where the citizens choose their representatives to make political decisions for 
them. However, democracy is also about what happens between the elections, 
such as demonstrations, referendums and the discussion of the public agenda. 
Lobbying is one form of trying to influence from underneath. There are two main 
ways of thinking within democracy theory. One looks at democracy as a form of 
decision-making of the issues that are important to society. The other emphasizes 
the extent to which citizens get their needs fulfilled in the decision-making; it is 
the content of the decisions taken that are of importance. (Larsson 1998, 18) The 
democratic system does not presume that every individual agrees to every public 
decision taken at every moment and conflict and a critical debate is essential to 
sustain the energy of the system. In a democracy based on indirect influence or 
representation such as elections, the citizens’ political power is limited to 
choosing persons that best represent their interest and can be held accountable for 
the policy-making. Most states do not rely solely on this representative system but 
also encourages participation in the policy-making through the formation of 
pressure groups. (Weale 1999: 85) 
 
The classical liberal theory, first represented by Mill and Rosseau, emphasizes 
the importance of widespread political participation by individuals. Both found it 
important that individuals were actively participating as citizens if true democracy 
was to be achieved. Other recent liberal theorists have argued that regular 
competitive elections is the key to a democratic government, however several 
suggest that the importance of opinion through pressure groups as well as open 
elections are the key features of a democracy. Interest groups have formed and 
acted alongside the formal governmental institutions in western industrialized 
societies and have come to play a very important role in the decision-making. 
First it was the development of employer and employee organizations, as the 
government, which was to manage economy, had to negotiate with producer 
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groups in order to make decisions accepted by these groups and as such were 
essential for decision-making. The evolution of the welfare state stimulated action 
from consumers, such as tenants, patients and parents, and the political parties had 
to negotiate with them to remain in power of government. (Ham, Hill 1993: 27) 
 
Robert Dahl argues in “Who governs” (1961) that power in western 
industrialized societies is widely distributed among different groups and referred 
to the system as a “polyarchi”. No groups are without power to influence and no 
group is necessarily dominant. Dahl, together with Nelson Polsby representing a 
pluralistic view in democracy theory has defined power as “when person A can 
make person B do something he otherwise wouldn’t have done”. However, power 
has many dimensions and Dahl develops further; “power can be investigated in a 
society’s politics by looking at who participates, who wins and looses, and who is 
successful in carrying through his will in the decision making.” (Gaventa 1980: 
29) Any group can ensure its political preferences if it is determined enough. 
These pluralist tendencies can be found and recognized also in the writings of 
political theory in Western Europe. Their pluralistic position does not hold that 
power is equally distributed among the participating groups in a specific arena, 
but rather argues that individuals and different groups in society do not have the 
same degree of power and the ability to influence. (Ham, Hill 1993: 27) For this 
thesis, three forms of power are essential: 
 
• Political power - control of the government and the political decisions 
made 
• Economic power - financial resources are needed for power and the 
distribution of resources is essential 
• Normative power - the ability to influence through information and 
language, to persuade 
 
There is one key factor in their discussion; no one is considered completely 
powerless. Everyone, including groups and individuals, do have power at some 
stage of the decision-making process, be it small or very significant. The pluralist 
theory does not see the sources of power, such as information, capital and 
expertise to be accumulated to one group or individual, instead power is 
fragmented and diffused. The idea of a political market place is an essential basic 
idea of the pluralists. What a group can achieve depends on its resources or 
sources of power. (Ham, Hill 1993: 27) Here, democracy can also be described as 
an arena where actors are allowed to test the force of their arguments, or as a prize 
to be gained by the actors that are most successful in stating their arguments. 
However, it is important to realize that because of the distribution of the different 
kinds of powers discussed above, the arena is structured to favor some contestants 
over others. (Rubin 2001: 712) 
 
In this paper the democratic implications of lobbying activities are essential. 
We have seen the problems of establishing democratic legitimacy through a 
representative system on an international level such as the European Union. 
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Modern thinking within democracy theory argues that the essence of democratic 
legitimacy on this level is to be found in deliberation, rather than in voting or 
representation of persons or interests. Deliberation or communication is the key to 
democracy, as the output may be perceived as legitimate as long as the process 
leading to it has involved the participation of the people subject to it. (Dryzek 
1999: 44) 
3.3.1 Deliberation and participation 
Democracy theory varies in the perception of what constitutes a democracy. 
For a non-state polity such as the European Union where representation is not 
sufficient, participation becomes essential in the debate over citizens’ control of 
the political agenda. The theories based on Rosseau emphasizes participation as 
central to the concept of democracy because it moralizes citizens and enables 
them to form an opinion on what is important for the common good. By 
participation I use a rather broad definition by Perry, Moyser and Day where 
participation means; “taking part in the process of formulation, passage and 
implementation of public policies.” (1992: 16) For this thesis, it is the formulation 
stage of a policy process that is the main focus. This means that participation is 
not just the voting directly on issues of decision-making but also to exercise 
control of the political agenda by initiating what issues is to be dealt with and the 
details of proposals for legislation. (Weale 1999: 84-85) 
 
Deliberative democratic theory uses the pluralist insight that citizens are often 
organized in political, social, or religious groups which constitutes much of the 
politically oriented activity performed by the citizens. The participation in such 
groups provides an opening to the investigation of social interchange, opinion 
formation, and conceptual development among the common citizens. This notion 
is something that other theories of democracy tend to give little importance or 
completely ignore. (Rubin, 2001:727) 
3.3.2 The participation of civil society 
 
The concept of civil society is central to the deliberative theory and to 
participatory democracy as this is where public reasoning takes place. The 
common goal for civil society is working towards the common good through 
public reasoning. However, associative democracy treats civil society differently 
and sees organizations or associations which have gained political functions 
through the delegation from authorities as more democratic. They are accountable 
both to their members as well as the public authorities, which ensures a high 
degree of responsibility towards its sponsors as well as members. (Michalowitz 
2004: 150-153) The role of a transnational civil society is largely about 
questioning, criticizing and publicizing the politics of the European Union. These 
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actions can help change course of action and even if civil society’s participation is 
based on a consultative relationship with the institutions, their communicative 
power still serves a democratic function. (Dryzek 1999: 45) 
 
Using deliberative democracy doesn’t necessarily explain the Commission’s 
relationship with civil society because the institution does not aim to create a 
space for public reasoning but rather a dialogue between the institution and the 
groups within civil society in the form of consultancy. The Commission stresses 
the role of the consultation process in the relationship with civil society. To 
achieve input legitimacy, accountability is necessary, something that is difficult to 
achieve with lobbying as those who represent the members usually cannot be 
removed. (Michalowitz 2004: 154) Lobbying opens a second channel to influence 
policy-making, something that helps legitimise a transnational system that lacks 
representation possibilities. There are however several democratic problems with 
the phenomena of lobbying as it requires resources that are unevenly distributed 
across society and because there are usually no possibilities to hold influencers 
accountable. 
 
Pluralists such as Schattschneider who followed Dahl and Polsby, later argued 
that the political arena on which organized interests compete for influence was 
characterized by inequality. Different groups had different possibilities to uphold 
their interests on this arena depending on their resources such as political, 
normative and economical power. He also stated that participation in 
organizations executing pressure contained an upper-class bias. Organizations 
from the economic life and corporations dominate the system and also have the 
most resources in form of capital. Research on individual participation in 
voluntary organizations also back up Schattschneiders theory as it shows 
significant class distinction: 
 
“the notion that the pressure system is automatically representative of the 
whole community is a myth fostered by the universalizing tendency of modern 
group theories. Pressure politics is a selective process ill designed to serve diffuse 
interests. The system is skewed, loaded, and unbalanced in favor of fraction of a 
minority…Probably about 90% of the people cannot get into the pressure 
system.” (Schattschneider 1960: 35) 
 
There are differences at the individual level when it comes to the ability and 
will to participate in organizations that carry out pressure in a political system. It 
has been suggested that members of such organizations are usually from a higher 
socio-economic group. (Naurin, 1999: 30) Also, interest groups that follow their 
own interests rather than those of the public cannot be regarded as contributing to 
democratic legitimacy, as they do not work towards the common good. 
(Michalowitz, 2004: 156) 
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3.4 Information and Democracy 
The development of the Information Society, with better communications that 
give us access to more information creates new demands for politics. There is an 
explicit connection between democracy and information, where free speech is 
often said to be the “cornerstone of a democracy.” Without unrestricted access to 
information, the political agenda cannot be controlled and it is therefore important 
to discuss the increased importance and dominance of information in our society 
today. (SOU 2000:1: 53) Information can be described as the strategic messages 
that will lead to increased knowledge, or what reduces uncertainty and changes 
previous knowledge. 
 
In a democratic society there are a number of ways to keep informed about 
what is going on in the political system; through experience, literate sources, 
associations and mass media. It is a must for democracy that its citizens have 
access to channels that can increase their knowledge and initiate debates 
concerning important issues in society. (Johnson 1999: 31-32) The development 
of the information society brings an enlargement of the political agenda and the 
struggle of what issue is to be debated and processed becomes even tighter. More 
issues are discovered, brought to the agenda and demand a solution. The 
increasing speed, knowledge and levels of politics demand more time and energy 
from the legislators on every political level; local, regional, national and 
international. Hence the ability to reach the attention of the legislators becomes 
more difficult, especially on the European level as this has been introduced as yet 
another level above the national, even further away from the citizens. Thus 
discussions and debates with the citizens are very rare and people might feel left 
behind in the decision-making. (SOU 2000:1:53) The information society creates 
a new market for political influence and it is important to have access to the 
information in order to make your needs become a priority. Normative power is 
important, as you can more easily influence someone when you have sufficient 
and quality information to persuade. 
 
The increased need for information by legislators creates a demand for 
participation by citizens and creates an exchange relationship between the 
decision makers and the public. Decision makers rely on the public for 
information, which in turn creates access to them and the decision making. 
3.4.1 Lobbying 
 
Lobbying is a way for special interests and pressure groups to influence the 
political decision-making process using information as a tool. There is a tension 
about the word as it is often associated with pressure on the decision-making 
system by financially powerful institutions and multi-national companies rather 
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than with the ability of economically weaker groups in society to influence. 
Actors representing these groups must therefore be present on the lobbying arena 
in order to safeguard democracy and competition between the different interests 
can be seen as beneficial for democracy. It is crucial that competition is open to 
everyone and that new actors may enter the scene. (LOGON 2002: 37) Lobbying 
can provide the legislator with information that will benefit the provider in the 
output of the political system, in legislation and the implementation of decisions. 
There are three concepts that define the core of lobbying activities: 
 
• Information – the strategic messages that will lead to increased 
knowledge. 
• Communication – the process of messages founded on interaction 
among those who participate in the process and lead to certain attitude, 
opinion and behavior. 
• Relation – the purpose of the information activities – mutual 
engagement and mutual tasks that lead to actions and results. 
 
The information activities fulfils an important function in every organization, 
be it a business, an institution, an authority or an association. Information serves 
different interests in an organization; it’s a tool to develop knowledge, attitude 
and commitments among its interest groups. It is also a tool to participate and is a 
condition for a democratic decision process. There are different ways of reaching 
legislators through information. Informal ways to reach decision-makers and to 
influence their decisions are separated in two categories; direct and indirect 
contacts.  
 
Direct contacts are usually associated with the concept of lobbying because it 
means direct contacts with the political decision-makers. This form of exercizing 
political pressure is usually the most successful but not available to everyone. A 
personal network is very important, but pressure can also be executed through 
simply providing the legislator with convincing written material and information 
about a topic to make sure they set their mind in the right direction and make the 
desired decision. Those groups that do not have the possibility to interact with the 
legislators in person often execute this second form of direct lobbying. The 
decision-maker often relies on this type of resources of information in order to be 
able to make up their mind and make decisions as they often lack the time to 
research for background material regarding every single decision they make. 
 
Indirect impact can be described as molding public opinion through media’s 
attention and make media deal with a special issue. This is performed through 
targeting the media and providing them with press releases, press kits and even 
video material that enables journalists to produce a proper news piece about the 
issue. Internet is also used as a forum for reaching the public. (SOU 1999:121: 
149-154) 
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4 Regional Lobbying in the European 
Union 
The EU helps form, design, implement and influence about 80 per cent of all 
the economic decisions as well as around 50 per cent of all the political decisions 
taken within the Union. Not only private companies but also civil society, 
including local governments and their associations need to be in direct contact 
with Brussels and the EU institutions. The arena where lobbying takes place is 
defined by the institutions that the campaigns work to influence, by their 
importance in relation to each other, and the form of their decision-making 
process. Numerous players seek their place in the European Union arena, not just 
commercial interests or NGO’s but also other governmental institutions such as 
member-state governments, third country governments as well as regional and 
local governments within the member states which are the focus of this thesis. 
Due to their positions close to the citizens, local governments are essential in the 
EU decision-making process. (Pedler 2002: 1) (LOGON 2002: 37) Warleigh has 
claimed that the lobbying community in Brussels can never account for a 
democratic participation of civil society because they will only represent their 
active members and never all citizens with an interest in their issue. (2001: 623-
624) 
 
This chapter aims to provide the essential observations regarding regions and 
their influence in policy-making. 
4.1 Regionalization 
 
Regionalization is a natural consequence of further European integration 
because work on regional development is promoted through the Structural Funds 
(see 4.1.1). Programming funded by these is expected to involve agents from 
regional and local levels and regions are bound to form an interest in lobbying at 
the European level. The Commission pushes increased regionalization through the 
power to redistribute regional funds, but forces from the bottom are also 
contributing to increased regional cooperation. Cultural and ethnic objectives are 
additional reasons, as well as competition between urban regions. Regional 
boundaries are bound to become increasingly flexible in the future, opening up 
possibilities of new coalitions and cooperation, linking regions closely together 
across and within regional boundaries with several different interests, although 
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most will remain economic. This development is likely to affect the structure of 
power within the EU. (Häggroth 1999: 160) In addition to their own individual 
interests, regions have a common interest in regionalism being promoted in the 
EU; like the institutional design of their influence, the design of partnerships in 
policy implementation and the interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. There 
is a constant strain between the promotion of regionalism and the pursuit of the 
individual interests. (Keating, Hooghe 2004: 243) 
 
Two reactions from the regions to the furthering of European integration can 
be identified. The transfer of competencies from national to European level, which 
directly influence them has caused both rejective and welcoming responses. The 
rejectionist view, which is still present in Scandinavia, fears a loss of democratic 
control. However, some regions see the transferring of competencies to this level 
as a source of political and economic opportunities, especially underdeveloped 
regions. Regions with a strained relationship to their central governments are also 
responding more positively. (Keating, Hooghe 2004: 241-242) 
4.1.1 Regional Policy 
Although several areas of policy-making are of interest to the regions, regional 
policy development is the number one priority for the regions. In order to make 
the understanding of the involvement of regions in EU policy-making more 
comprehensible I want to describe Regional Policy as well as the process for its 
decision-making in more detail.  
 
Regional policy stands for more than a third of the EU budget and its priority 
is job creation in order to strengthen the political, social and economic 
possibilities of all 254 regions in the European Union. The redistribution of the 
funds available is a tool for solidarity, which is even mentioned in the preamble of 
the Treaty of the European Union. The Treaty specifies that; “the Community acts 
to strengthen its economic and social cohesion and specifically to reduce the gaps 
among levels of development in the various regions.” Together with the funds 
provided by the Member States, regional policy is co-funded by the European 
funds, Structural Funds and the Cohesion fund.  
 
The Structural Funds sponsors four thematic areas where the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) finances infrastructure, job-creating 
investment, local development projects and aid for small firms. The European 
Social Fund (ESF) sponsors unemployed and disadvantaged groups’ access and 
return to the workforce. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) 
works to modernize fishing and the Guidance Section of the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF-Guidance) finances rural 
development measures and provides aid for farmers, mainly in severely 
underdeveloped regions. They have three objectives; to help regions lagging 
behind economically to catch up, to support economic and social conversion in 
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industrial, rural, urban or fisheries dependent areas facing structural difficulties 
and thirdly to modernize systems of training and promoting employment. 
 
Four Community initiatives have been developed to solve problems facing all 
Member States and regions. Interreg III supports the development of crossborder, 
interregional and transnational cooperation and Urban II supports the innovation 
in urban areas. Leader+ aims to promote rural development initiatives and 
EQUAL serves to combat discrimination on the job market.  
 
The Cohesion Fund is designated for the least developed Member States, 
before 2004 these were Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Between 2004 and 
2006 a third of this budget is reserved for the 10 new Member States. This fund 
does not finance programmes but rather projects or stages of projects that have 
been identified beforehand. They are managed by national authorities that then 
submit the projects to the Commission. (European Commission 2005) 
4.1.2 The Policy Process for Regional Policy 
 
A proposal for the rules guiding the use of the Structural funds and the budget 
is proposed by the Commission after a negotiation with the European Parliament 
and the European Council decides upon the proposal. The funds are allocated by 
country and priority objective. The Commission defines which areas can take 
advantage of a form of aid in agreement with the Member States and it also 
defines common thematic guidelines for the states to accept. Taking into account 
the Commission’s thematic guidelines, the states and regions then gathers and 
formulates proposals in a plan to support the regions. Once established, the plans 
are presented to the Commission who then reaches an agreement with the states 
before it adopts the plans and programmes. It provides an advance to the states in 
order to initiate the programs. National or regional authorities decide the details of 
the programs, which don’t need to be negotiated with the Commission but are sent 
to it for informational purpose. The authority responsible for administration of the 
funds selects the projects and distributes the funds. It is responsible for monitoring 
the progress and keeps the Commission informed on the usage of the funds. The 
Commission makes sure that the control system for the spending of the funds is 
working properly and organizes exchanges on certain themes. It is also a task of 
the Commission to keep the authorities informed about of any new priorities 
within the Community that has an impact on regional development. (European 
Commission 2005) 
 
 
 
4.2 Regional Influence at the Sub-Systemic Level 
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The sub-systemic level where policy-shaping takes place is where regional 
actors such as regional offices have an ability to influence and the Commission is 
therefore the primary partner for the regions. The policy-shaping decisions do not 
decide EU policy, instead policy-shaping decisions are taken early in the policy-
making process, at the formulation stage. What policy options will be pushed 
forward in the process, and what options will be cast aside as well as the details of 
the policies are determined at this stage and are still rather flexible. Later on at the 
systemic level, policy becomes inflexible because modification means that the 
bargaining have to start over. After the Commission has presented a proposal 
there is hardly any room left for external influence. (Peterson, Bomberg 1999: 21-
22) 
 
It has been established that in order to secure influence in EU policy-making it 
is important to focus efforts to influence as early as possible in the process, further 
emphasizing the importance for lobbying activities at this stage The earlier one 
can identify the upcoming issues on the political agenda the better opportunities 
one has to actually make a difference. In the European Union this means that the 
lobbyist should react to the Green papers circulating in the Commission that later 
on are developed into White Papers. Close connections with lower officials at the 
Commission are therefore often fruitful. Monitoring informal channels within 
interest groups, in addition to the overall lobbying community or other EU 
institutions, also reveals issues that potentially may reach the political agenda. 
(Jerneck, Gidlund 2001: 118-121) 
 
The Single Market program from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s marked the 
high point of the Commission’s power and influence and since then the member 
governments have strongly emphasised the intergovernmental aspect of the 
European Union through the Treaty of Maastricht. The member states through the 
Council of Ministers are setting the EU’s agenda through summits of the 
European Council. In addition, the crisis in the Commission in 1999 further 
decreased its reputation and influence. However, the Commission is still the key 
player in initiating policy and implementing decisions that affect the citizens of 
the EU. As the Commission is the sole initiator and drafter of legislation it holds a 
powerful tool in a polity such as the European Union that involve so many actors. 
It can amend or withdraw legislation at any point in the policy-making process. It 
annually produces between two and three hundred reports, white papers, green 
papers and other studies and communications. This requires good access to 
information. Because regions can be defined broadly as a part of civil society and 
these have increased access to funds from the EU, their participation in decision-
making is crucial. Academics usually describe the Commission as the key-player 
in the involvement of sub-national actors because of its agenda-setting function. 
The relationship enables the regional actors to bypass the national government in 
the initial policy-making. (Pedler 2002:4)  (Hooghe, Marks 2003: 294-295) 
 
To resolve the conflicts that arise with the EU’s redistributive policies is 
important. Regional policy redistributes resources of specific groups and 
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individuals at the expense of others. The power to distribute funds, for example to 
regions and local authorities is an important source of legitimacy. It is something 
that the Commission as well as the member states’ governments are eager to 
control. (Héritier 1999: 62-64) The logic for EU regional policy is the same as 
national regional policies; because of economic restructuring some regions are 
suffering and it is a social compensation for these. It is also a means to legitimise 
the European Union in regions where support for further integration is weak. An 
example being Great Britain as the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) was founded in order to compensate for the country’s net contribution to 
the EU in the beginning of its membership. In the beginning the administration of 
the funds were handled on a national level but over the years the Commission has 
taken more and more responsibility in order to gain power. (Keating 1998: 173) 
 
Through the Commission’s working groups, representatives from regional and 
local governments have an opportunity to participate in the initiation process of 
policy-making, also known as the sub-systemic level where policy-shaping takes 
place. The invitations are sent to the Permanent Representation and they are 
forwarded to the national government for distribution among the ministries who 
then decide who participates. A good relationship with the national government is 
therefore an essential part of successful networking in Brussels. Even if regional 
governments have reasonable resources and have their own Brussels office they 
often have difficulties in determining a short list of priorities. They lobby mainly 
for subsidies and are invited to formal and semi-formal EU meetings and often 
succeed in presenting a European face when cooperating with other regions within 
Europe. However their government background with elected politicians and mass 
publicity essential on the home front often leaves difficulties in determining 
priorities beforehand as well as a critical evaluation of activities afterwards. 
(LOGON 2002: 40) 
4.3 Formal Influence in Policy-Making 
In order to bring the European Union closer to its citizens, the Commission 
has invited regional and local governments to formally participate in the decision-
making. This represents formal civil society participation and is interesting for 
this analysis. 
4.3.1 Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions was established to give the regions a formal 
channel of influence and the members are representatives from regional and local 
government that are appointed by their central government. Because it is a form of 
organized formal participation in the policy-shaping process it does not hold 
evident democratic implications.  
  22 
 
About 75 per cent of all EU legislation is implemented at a local level so it makes 
sense that the regions get a formal opportunity to voice their concerns to the 
Commission. To close the gap between the EU level and the citizens it made 
sense to include the elected governments closest to the citizens. The Treaties state 
that the Commission and Council must consult the Committee of the Regions 
whenever new proposals are made in areas that have implications for the regional 
and local level. The Maastricht Treaty set out five areas that require consultation; 
economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health, 
education and culture. The Amsterdam Treaty added another five areas; 
employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational training and 
transport. Outside the areas established in the Treaties the EU institutions can 
consult the CoR in any issue that concerns them and the Committee can draw an 
opinion on its own initiative, giving it an agenda-setting function.  
 
Three main principles guide the work of this committee: 
• Subsidiarity, which was written into the Treaties as the CoR was 
established. Decision within the EU should be taken as close to the 
citizen as possible and the EU should not take on tasks that are better 
suited for national, regional and local administrations. 
• Proximity, which means that all levels of government should organize 
their work with transparency in mind so that the citizens know who is 
in charge and responsible for a particular issue. 
• Partnership, which holds that all levels of governance should cooperate 
and be involved in the decision-making process. (Committee of the 
Regions, 2005) 
 
4.4 Informal Influence in Policy-Making 
In addition to these formal channels, regional and local governments have 
increased their participation through informal channels by establishing regional 
offices in Brussels. 
4.4.1 The role of Regional Offices in Brussels 
According to state-centric models of influence in the European Union, regions 
traditionally need to lobby their central state to maintain their interests in 
Brussels. But regions have created a new role for themselves and bypassed the 
dependence on central government for access to influencing EU policy-making, 
especially by opening their own permanent offices in Brussels. Even if they do not 
have equal formal power to influence, informal channels still play an important 
part in the struggle for power through information. (Stéclebout 2003: 3-5) 
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The Commission strongly encouraged the establishment of the Regional 
Offices, and there are several reasons for this encouragement. It is suggested to be 
a means for the Commission to maintain its power over national states through its 
control over the Structural Funds and its informal exchanges with the regional 
offices. The involvement of several interests diversifies the policy-shaping, makes 
the system more transparent to civil society and increases its control of the 
political agenda. The Commission strongly depends on external sources for 
information, as the organization is quite small in proportion to the wide range of 
issues and the amount of information that it processes in order to make decisions. 
To add to its sources from national government influence it encourages the 
emergence of lobbying in all fields, private as well as local and regional 
authorities that provide it with viewpoints on issues that concern them. They have 
even created formal channels of influence in order to achieve the above-
mentioned goals. Regions are frequently invited to state their opinion on matters 
that are of interest to them, especially when it comes to regional policy. (Peterson, 
Bomberg 1999: 80-81) (Stéclebout 2003: 3-5) 
 
Regions have established offices for different reasons and they also have 
different status just as the regions themselves are more or less powerful and 
established for different purposes. Some represent civil society to a large extent; 
some represent pure public interest while some combine the representation of the 
public with the private interests of the region. (Keating, Hooghe 2004: 245) The 
increased role of the regions in a globalized society leads to the natural 
consequence that regions need to protect their interests, which are becoming 
increasingly political and economical to its nature. The main purpose is to support 
the regions need for resources, political as well as economical, so that welfare and 
development can be developed in a society characterized by interdependence. The 
establishment of the integrated market means that local units need to take a larger 
economical responsibility apart from producing welfare. The increased activities 
of the regions and the regional offices means that they need to formulate their 
interest in amore precise manner which can turn out to be a difficult task because 
of the region’s increasing agenda. Not only states, but increasingly regions, are 
competing for market shares and political influence. This competition is not 
limited to regions within the state, but also to regions within Europe which 
introduces a lot of issues on the region’s agenda. (Jerneck, Gidlund: 2001: 164-
168) 
 
In a survey performed by Michalowitz (2004), lobbyists in Brussels, including 
regional offices, pointed out seven factors as essential for successful lobbying: 
representativity, professionalization, strategic advice, image-building, lobbying of 
other actors, and the delivery of expertise and contact provision. The investigation 
showed that lobbying in Brussels is very goal oriented and that the interest of 
public actors is well taken into account. The survey also showed that regional 
offices dealt with fewer activities than associations, firms or political consultants. 
Their operations were limited to lobbying for regional interests, promotion of EU 
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in their own region as well as promotion of the region in the EU and informal 
legislative negotiating. Michalowitz did however not include political monitoring 
as a variable. Perhaps because this is the foundation of any lobbying activity, as 
you need to be informed about what is going on in the political system to perform 
effective lobbying. (Michalowitz, 2004: 163) 
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5 The South Sweden European Office 
In order to gain a closer insight in the activities of the regions and their 
regional offices I have used the region of South Sweden as an example. The 
regions and the regional offices represent civil society participation in the EU. 
This is a small case study in order to shed further light on the focus of this thesis; 
the democratic implications of the lobbying by regions for influence in the policy-
making of the European Union. 
 
As regions in Sweden such as counties or municipals are quite small in a large 
polity such as the European Union several regional and local governments have 
created informal networks comprising a region that have no other defined political 
connection to each other. The limitations of what counties and municipals are to 
participate depends solely on their desire to access the decision-making in the EU. 
Hence, SydSam was created to gain access to the Structural Funds within EU:s 
regional policy and the region of South Sweden that Sydsam represents is in this 
function solely founded on economical reasons even though there might be 
historical and cultural ties.  
 
In the initiation phase of the regional office, Sydsam cooperated with an 
existing German office before establishing the office and the German model was 
used to create the operations. The establishment of physical resources took 
approximately 6 months, finding an office space, recruiting personnel and creating 
office material and brochures. An even more important issue was the 
establishment of a contact network and the marketing of the region through 
effective and appropriate communication channels. During this phase the 
activities of the regional office was labelled as informational activities rather than 
lobbying, this is due to the negative associations with the word lobbying that still 
exist, especially in Sweden.. (Jerneck, Gidlund 2001: 59-60) 
 
The members of Sydsam are the County Councils in Jönköping and 
Kronoberg, the County Associations of Local Authorities in Jönköping and 
Kronoberg, The Regional Council in Kalmar County, Region Blekinge, Region 
Skåne and Halland Regional Development Council. The local authorities have 
several common interests but each region within the organization has different 
preconditions and potential. (Kaliff 2005) 
 
The tasks of Sydsam are as follows 
 
• To coordinate and uphold South Sweden’s joint interests on the basis 
of an interregional/international approach and as a region in Europe 
  26 
• To represent South Sweden in contacts with the EU, the Swedish 
Government and regional representatives in the other Baltic countries 
in discussions about the development of the southern Baltic region into 
a thriving growth region, in accordance with the intentions of its 
principals and in specific issues. 
• To promote and increase knowledge about the importance of the 
region by working in various specialist fields in ways that 
complements the efforts of the members. 
• To continue to build and consolidate the network in South Sweden 
with the aim to broaden the commitment to the interests of South 
Sweden and utilizing existing resources so as to avoid double work. 
 
The highest decision-making body is the General Assembly with 
representatives appointed by each member. These are locally and regionally 
elected officials from all parties. In turn the General Assembly appoints the 
executive body; the Executive Committee. The organization can be portrayed as a 
network, where the pre-determined political issues to be focused on connect the 
local governments within the region and make them interdependent. The 
legitimacy of the organization is founded in the elected officials. Some of the 
regional offices in Brussels are sponsored by private interests who pay for their 
membership but this is not the case for any of the regional offices in Sweden. 
(Jerneck, Gidlund 2001: 89) 
 
5.1 Tasks of the South Sweden European Office 
 
The South Sweden European Office is an integrated part of the operations and 
its mission is “to support SydSam and its member organizations in the promotion 
of South Sweden as an active, thriving region in the South Baltic and Europe at 
large.” Issues important to the member organizations are largely handled at home, 
while the role of the Regional Office is to work with tasks that can only be 
handled in Brussels. It involves providing information about the European Union, 
project support, visitors’ service, monitoring the political scene and organize 
events. (Sydsam 2003: 19) Important for this thesis is to emphasize that the main 
task of the SSEO is to monitor the political scene in the EU, in order to initiate 
political activities that are essential for the region of South Sweden. Through the 
monitoring, and the relationship with the Commission, the regional office can 
provide information about upcoming legislation to the local governments in South 
Sweden. This is done independently, together with other regional offices and 
networks that have an interest in the issue at hand. The activities of the SSEO 
must be adapted to the interests of Sydsam and are continuously changing because 
it prioritizes political issues that are of current importance to South Sweden. The 
SSEO also focuses its activities on monitoring what’s going on with issues that 
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involve the larger Baltic Region, not only because it is important to South Sweden 
but because the regions around the Baltic are its key cooperation partners. 
Important sources of information are the conferences arranged by EU institutions, 
regional offices, think tanks, network meetings, newsletters and the Internet. The 
role of expressing the view of South Sweden on a particular issue in the 
Commission is handled by the political representatives from the region. However, 
the officials at the SSEO also represent the views informally at events and 
conferences in Brussels. The Commission is increasingly arranging conferences to 
communicate new inititatives (Bergman 2005) (Kaliff 2005) (Sydsam 2002:14) 
(Sydsam 2003: 21) 
 
Because Sweden was reluctant to membership this influenced the ability to 
create the office and the operation. Sydsam has since questioned the effectiveness 
of the initiating activities in receiving regional benefits from the Structural Funds. 
Roger Kaliff, the president of the Executive Committee compared the initial 
activities with the success of regional offices from Finland and concluded that the 
own office had not been as successful. He explains the poor success with the 
reluctance of the government and hence the regional and local authorities to a 
membership in the European Union. (Kaliff 2005) Also during this phase, the 
activities of the office were very much determined by the officials themselves but 
now the politicians decide on the agenda. The officials themselves find that this is 
positive because it creates more legitimacy for their operations and shows that 
there is a greater interest for the operations in the home region. (Jerneck, Gidlund 
2001: 87) 
 
Because the activities of the regional office mainly consist of monitoring of 
the EU political scene as well as informal networking in Brussels there are 
problems with evaluating the success of the activities. The regional office as well 
as Kaliff as the representative of Sydsam agrees that an evaluation of the activities 
would benefit the operations in order to increase efficiency. The regional office 
has a desire for clearer instructions on what issues to focus on. Sydsam is however 
satisfied with the performance of the office according to Kaliff and there are no 
plans on increasing the operations of the office in the form of manpower, capital 
or other resources. This is because the amounts of legislation on policies that 
concern the region as well as regions in general have decreased. Kaliff states that 
Sydsam is satisfied with the decreased activity when it comes to legislation from 
the EU, as Sweden is resisting legislation in further areas. (Kaliff 2005) 
(Bergman, 2005) 
 
The office has produced a couple of press releases to Swedish newspapers but 
this activity does not occur very often. The reason for this is according to 
Bergman that Swedish newspapers are not interested in publishing what is going 
on at the EU level. (Bergman 2005) Together with monitoring the political scene 
and the production of a weekly newsletter that is sent home to the member 
authorities in South Sweden, visitors’ service take up a substantial amount of time 
for the office. This stream of delegations, students, businesses and also tourists 
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usually come from the home region even though it can vary. This activity is part 
of the informational service the office is expected to perform and is also an 
important tool for creating legitimacy for the operations. (Jerneck, Gidlund 2001: 
88) 
5.2 The Relationship With the Swedish National 
Government 
When the Swedish regions started to establish their own representations in 
Brussels through their regional offices the national government appeared 
surprised and that is possibly why no regulations regarding this activity was 
formulated. It did however not encourage this activity but the absence of 
regulations enabled the regions to create their own role on the European level. 
South Sweden chose to label its activities as ‘interregional’ in order to escape 
national government accusations of dealing with ‘foreign affairs’. (Jerneck, 
Gidlund 2001: 68-69) 
 
During the first few years of the office’s activities in Brussels the relationship 
with the Swedish Permanent Representation was consequently very tense. The 
Permanent Representation found that they should represent the interests of the 
region in the EU through the influence and communication executed from the 
local governments to the central authority on the national arena. Today, there is a 
close cooperation between the regional office representing Sydsam and the 
Permanent Representation and they increasingly consider the opinions expressed 
by the region. Direct interactions between the representatives of both agencies 
take place regularly. The main tension between the region and the Swedish 
national government is the budget for the Structural Funds as these are contributed 
to by the member states. The negotiations for the next period of 2007- 2013 are 
currently taking place. The Swedish government wants to contribute to these with 
one per cent of the total budget to the EU while the region wants 1.14. Kaliff 
predicts a compromise where the final amount will land somewhere in between 1 
and 1.14 per cent. (Kaliff 2005) (Bergman 2005) 
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6 Conclusions 
The theoretical framework was designed to investigate democratic 
implications with regional lobbying activities. I intend to point to observations of 
the activities that create democratic legitimacy and those observations that may 
point to the opposite.  
 
Multi-Level Governance stresses the multiple points of access in the European 
Union, which enables several actors to exercise influence. This theory therefore 
justifies the participation of regional actors that by-pass the nation-state in their 
efforts to influence policy-making. This is an entirely different view of the system 
that intergovernmentalism tends to ignore through its emphasis on states as main 
actors on the European arena. Regions have created an additional communication 
channel with the European Union and do not rely solely on the central 
government to represent their interest and inform them of the EU’s political 
agenda. The Commission has welcomed their participation in an effort to increase 
its own power, but also to achieve legitimacy by civil society participation. This 
creation of networks makes information and communication essential for the 
system as the different actors depend on each other’s resources. 
 
During the research process I found that regional interest was represented 
through both formal and informal channels. They are interdependent for the 
region’s full participation, but the informal activities are emphasized as they bring 
democratic implications. The system has traits of a pluralistic system where the 
lobbying arena welcomes new participants with different interests and different 
resources to influence. 
 
There is no pure democratic theory that explains transnational governance, but 
the use of concepts such as representation and participation is essential. It has 
been established that representation in the European Union is insufficient. 
Participation is a central theme to democracy, but democracy theory varies in its 
emphasis on its importance and some theorists even argue that representation is 
the only adequate way of achieving legitimacy. If we assume that participation is 
essential for democratic legitimacy, the lobbying activities by the regional offices 
can be justified. It is important for the regions representing a broad civil society to 
control the political agenda and this is achieved by being informed about what is 
going on at the European level. They do not rely solely on the central government 
to represent their interest in decision-making that directly affects them. Regional 
Policy is an example of a policy area that affects the regions directly and they 
need to stay informed on decisions taken in regards to this area although the 
monitoring includes other political issues.  
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The regional offices have been established mainly to monitor the scene and 
inform the regions back home so that they can take political action when needed. 
From a deliberative standpoint this informational activity is actually a desire for 
democracy to work. Citizens need to be as informed as possible in order to enable 
them to form an opinion on what is important for the common good and to control 
the political agenda as it helps increase transparency. This activity creates 
normative power, as you need to be in control of the information in order to 
influence. 
 
Apart from the theoretical dilemma of democratic legitimacy through 
representation and/or participation, the democratic problem with lobbying also 
lies in its dependence on economical resources to exercise influence. Lobbying 
usually represents a special interest, where the collective interest is ignored and 
political power is limited to the members of the organization that manages to 
influence the decision-making. When it comes to regional lobbying we find 
variations, but most, including South Sweden, represent the public as a whole and 
not a specific interest. 
 
A simple model explains the relationship between the different powers when it 
comes to regional participation in policy-shaping.  
 
 
 
Pressure groups are dependent on capital resources to establish an 
organization that can exercise normative influence such as providing information 
and convincing legislators to make decisions that are beneficial to them. This 
normative power in turn leads to political power when the group is successful in 
their efforts to influence policy-shaping. Although business interests normally 
have more economic power than those representing the weaker groups in society, 
these groups gain normative power through their credibility as representing non-
profit interest. They may therefore not need the same amount of economic power 
to begin with. When it comes to regional offices and especially South Sweden, my 
case study, it represents businesses in the region as well as the public. Its founding 
members do not include any paying members and they are therefore working for 
Civil 
Society 
European 
Commission 
Political Power 
Economical 
Power 
Normative 
Power 
Participation 
Region/ 
Regional 
Office 
Representation 
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the region in general and not for a specific interest. Because Sydsam’s members 
are the elected officials of counties and municipalities this analysis actually 
includes an element of representation. This creates accountability which is one of 
the problems with lobbying or interest group participation. The model includes an 
indication of where representation and participation takes place. The officials 
working at the Regional Office are naturally not elected through a democratic 
process but are appointed by officials that in turn are responsible for the office’s 
activities. Regional office lobbying activities therefore includes an element of 
accountability, even if it is not strong. Also I have chosen to combine the 
Regional Office with the term ‘Region” in the model, since formal participation in 
the consultancy process with the European Commission is performed by the 
elected politicians from the region, while the Regional Office stands for the 
informal influence on policy-shaping by representing the view of the region on 
informal occasions. Economical power is needed to sponsor informational 
activities such as lobbying. The Regional Office is sponsored by Sydsam 
consisting of local governments and the activities are sponsored by civil society, 
here the citizens of South Sweden, through taxation. It is however the normative 
power of the region that is most important. Because it represents all groups within 
the region it holds credibility. This can be stated as the Commission encourages 
its participation. 
 
Because the regions are participating in policy-shaping and representing the 
interests of the region, and working for the common good, this helps democratic 
legitimacy in the sense that it opens a communication channel for the region with 
the Commission. The normative power that the Region is able to exercise helps 
bring political power to the citizens. 
 
During research I realized that there was a problem with evaluation of the 
lobbying activities, recognized by the regional office as well as Sydsam. There 
was no method in place to conduct this part of the operations. Lack of evaluation 
is however a problem for transparency, as there is no possibility of knowing how 
successful the lobbying activities are and it becomes more difficult to achieve 
transparency. In addition, the regional office mainly communicates their activities 
to the local governments and does not really use mass media. They rely solely on 
Internet as a forum to provide information directly to the citizens. Mass media is 
one of the most important channels for citizens to stay informed and create public 
discussion. On the other hand, the visitors’ service that the office performs and 
that take up a lot of their time also help create legitimacy and provide information 
to the public. 
 
The observations drawn from this research provide answers that both support 
the idea that the lobbying activities of the regions help democratic legitimacy in 
the European Union, as well as point to elements that may not.  
 
  32 
7 References 
7.1 Bibliography 
Bache, Ian, 1998. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance 
or Flexible Gatekeeping, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 
 
CEEC - Logon Report, 2002. Local Governments Network of Central and Eastern European 
Countries, http://www.ceec-logon.net/reports/report3.html 
 
Christiansen, Thomas, 2004. “The European Commission. Administration in Turbulent 
Times” in: European Union – Power and Policy-Making, ed: Richardson, Jeremy. 2nd ed., 
London: Routledge 
 
Committee of the Regions, Presentation, http://www.cor.eu.int, visited 2005-04-10 
 
Dahl, Robert, A., 1961. Who governs? New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Dryzek, John, S., 1999. “Transnational Democracy” in: The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, 30-51 
 
European Commission, 2005. Regional Policy – Inforegio, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/ns_en.htm, visited 2005-04-03 
 
Falkner, Gerda, 1997. “Corporatist Governance and Europeanisation: No Future in the Multi-
Level Game?” in: European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1, No. 11 
 
Gaventa, J., 1980. Power and Powerlessness, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Hallström, Lars K., 2003. “Support for European Federalism? – An Elite View” in: European 
Integration, Vol. 25, pp. 51–72 
 
Ham, C., Hill, M., 1993. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, New York: 
Harvester 
 
Häggroth, Sören, 1999. “European Integration and Municipal Self-Government – the case of 
Sweden” in: Nordic Region-Building in a European Perspective, eds: Baldersheim, Harald, - 
Ståhlberg, Krister. Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd,  
 
Held, David, 1996. Democracy and the Global Order - From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance, London: Polity Press. 
  33 
 
Héritier, Adrienne, 1999. Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe – Escape from Deadlock, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Hermansson, Jörgen - Lund, Anna - Svensson, Torsten - Öberg, Per-Ola, 1999.  
Avkorporativisering och lobbyism, SOU 1999:121, Stockholm 
 
 
Hooghe, Liesbet – Marks, Gary, 2003. “Multi-Level Governance in the European Union” in: 
The European Union – Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, 3rd ed., 
Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan 
 
Jachtenfuchs, M., 1998. “Democracy and Governance in the European Union” in: Democracy 
and the European Union eds: Follesdal, A. – Koslowski, P., 2nd ed., Berlin: Springer 
 
Jerneck, Magnus - Gidlund, Janerik, 2001. Komplex flernivådemokrati – Regional lobbying i 
Bryssel, Malmö: Liber 
 
Johnson, Anders, 1999. Rätt att lobba – om politisk påverkan efter korporatismens fall, 
Stockholm: Timbro 
 
Keating Michael, 1998. The New Regionalism in Western Europe – Territorial Restructuring 
and Political Change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
 
Keating, Michael - Hooghe, Liesbet, 2004. “Bypassing the nation-state? Regions and the EU 
policy process” in: European Union – Power and Policy-Making, ed: Richardson, Jeremy. 2nd 
ed., London: Routledge 
 
King, Gary - Keohane, Robert, O. - Verba, Sidney, 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Larsson, Torbjörn, 1998. Det svenska statsskicket, Lund: Studentlitteratur 
 
Lundquist, Lennart, 1997. Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik, Lund: Studentlitteratur 
 
Marsh, David – Stoker, Gary, 2002. Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd ed., 
Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan 
 
Moravscik, Andrew 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmental Approach" in Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal 
Dynamics and Global Context, eds: Bulmer, S. – Scott, A., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
 
Michalowitz, Irina, 2004. “Analysing Structured Paths of Lobbying Behaviour: Why 
Discussing the Involvement of ‘Civil Society’ Does not Solve the EU’s Democratic Deficit” 
in: European Integration Vol. 26, No. 2, 145-170 
 
Naurin, Daniel, 2001. Lobbyism, korporatism eller den stängda dörrens politik? 
Institutionella reformer för och mot intressegrupper. SNS Författningsprojekt, SNS 
 
  34 
Newman, Michael, 2004. “Democracy and Accountability in the EU” in: European Union – 
Power and Policy-Making, ed: Richardson, Jeremy. 2nd ed., London: Routledge 
 
Parry, G. – Moyser, G. – Day, N., 1992. Political Participation and Democracy in Britain, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Pedler, Robin, 2002. European Union Lobbying – Changes in the Arena, Hampshire: 
Palgrave 
 
Peterson, John – Bomberg, Elizabeth, 1999. Decision-making in the European Union, eds: 
Nugent, Neill – Paterson, William, E. – Wright, Vincent, Hampshire: Palgrave 
 
Rubin, Edward, 2001. “Getting past democracy” in: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Vol. 149 No. 3, 711-793 
 
Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston 
 
SOU 2000:1, En uthållig demokrati – Politik för folkstyrelse på 2000-talet, Stockholm, 
Sweden 
 
Steclébout,  Eloïse. 2003, Informational Lobbying and Conflict over Power: Modelling 
Decision-Making Processes in EU Regional Policies, Paper presented at the 2003 EAEP 
Conference, Maastricht, The Netherlands November 7-10 2003 
 
Sydsam. 2003, Annual Report, 
 
Sydsam. 2002, Strategi för Sydsam, eds: Kaliff, Roger – Sonesson, Carl 
http://www.sydsam.se/uppgifter/pdf/strategi_slutversion.pdf 
 
Wallén, G., 1996, Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmetodik, Lund: Studentlitteratur 
 
Warleigh, Alex, 2001, “‘Europeanizing’ Civil Society: NGOs as Agents of Political 
Socialization” in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, 619-639 
 
Weale, Albert. 1999, Democracy – Issues in Political Theory, Hampshire: McMillan 
7.2 Other sources 
Bergman, Frida, administrative official at the South Sweden European Office (SSEO) in 
Brussels, 2005-02-18: Presentation of Sydsam and the SSEO 
 
Kaliff, Roger, president of the executive committee of Sydsam, 2005-04-18: interview 
 
Ohlsson, Annica, administrative official, Sydsam Secretariat, 2005-02-11 – 2005-05-02 
 
